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ABSTRACT
Security researchers have stated that the core concept be-
hind current implementations of access control predates the
Internet. These assertions are made to pinpoint that there
is a foundational gap in this field and one should consider
revisiting the concepts from the ground up. Insider threats,
which are an increasing threat vector against organizations,
are associated to the failure of access control. An in-depth
analysis of relevant data leakage incidents, such as Wik-
iLeaks, further motivates an outside of the box thinking for
developing novel and effective countermeasures.
Access control models derived from access control matrix
encompass three sets of entities, Subjects, Objects and Op-
erations. Typically, objects are considered to be files and
operations are regarded as Read, Write, and Execute. This
implies an ‘open sesame’ approach when granting access to
data, i.e. once access is granted there is no restriction on
command executions. Inspired by Functional Encryption,
we propose applying access authorizations at a much finer
granularity, but instead of an ad-hoc or computationally
hard cryptographic approach, we postulate a foundational
transformation to access control. From an abstract view-
point, we suggest storing access authorizations as a three
dimensional tensor, which we call Access Control Tensor
(ACT). In Function-based Access Control (FBAC), applica-
tions do not give blind folded execution right and can only
invoke commands that have been authorized for data seg-
ments. In other words, one might be authorized to use a
certain command on one object, while being forbidden to
use exactly the same command on another object. Obvi-
ously, such a behavior can not be modeled using the classical
access control matrix.
The theoretical foundations of FBAC are presented along
with Policy, Enforcement and Implementation (PEI) require-
ments of it. A critical analysis of the advantages of deploy-
ing FBAC, how it will result in developing a new generation
of applications, and compatibility with existing models and
systems is also included. Finally, a proof of concept imple-
mentation of FBAC is presented.
1. INTRODUCTION
We believe there are several reasons as to why we need
to fundamentally revise the foundations of access control,
and develop models from ground up to overcome existing
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limitations. The misuse of legitimate access to data is a
serious information security concern for both organizations
and individuals. From a security engineering viewpoint, this
is partially due to the failure of access control. To help
the reader reflect on the limitations of existing access con-
trol, and better understand our motivation for this work, we
briefly revise two of the most prevailing cases.
The Wikileaks case was the largest leak of military and
diplomatic cables in US history [1]. After the September
11 terrorist attacks on US soil, government agencies in the
United States began allowing a greater sharing of informa-
tion as a defence procedure against future terrorist strikes
[2]. This included, sharing of confidential information be-
tween the US Department of State and the US Department
of Defence. However, in 2010 after a massive leak of diplo-
matic cables by Manning, a low-ranked personnel of the
army, the US Department of State revoked this access, to
prevent further leaks. As thoroughly explained in [1], Man-
ning did not break any system and used his own credentials
to access the most sensitive information. Unbelievably, all
he had to do was to copy information to a CD drive and
take it home.
As our second example we refer to the case when twenty
five Million records of United Kingdom (UK) nationals were
lost by an employee of Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs
(HMRC) [3]. The employee copied the entire available con-
fidential data onto disks and sent it through post [4].
As implied, the main reason behind these incidents is that
once user is granted authorization to access data, s/he has
the full authority on how to to use it. This is associated to
one of today’s most prominent security threats, known as
Insider Threat [5]. A malicious insider threat is defined as
“when an authorized entity of a system intentionally exceeds
or misuses granted access in a manner that negatively affects
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organiza-
tion’s information, or information systems” [6]. Recently,
insider threats have increased both in number and as a per-
centage of all cybeattacks; and, various estimates indicate
that at least 80 million cases occur in United States per
year [7]. Evidently, as with the case of access revokation
to the US Department of Defence, removing access is not a
remedy for this type of security threat. Neither is requiring
high security clearance for every officer/employee or enforc-
ing strict limitation, as all of these prevent an organization
performing its usual tasks. In this dilemma, an organization
to continue its operations has to put trust on its users and
this eventually leads to ‘over-privileged’ users phenomena [5,
8]. We argue that rather than an ‘open sesame’ approach
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in access control [9], we need models and mechanisms that
allow an authorized entity to perform required operations on
confidential information but not have full access to it. As a
simple example, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
agent should be able to search in confidential information
but s/he should only see the relevant information and not
be able to run any other operation on it, such as copy and
print. At the same time, to ensure information flow control,
access restrictions should be applied at the lowest possible
level, i.e. data block. Indeed, our ideas are not restricted
to text and also applies to images and videos. For example,
even when viewing an image - we consider this as being a
write operation on the device “screen” - only relevant parts
of an image must be shown with the non-authorized parts
blurred. With existing multi-level security and access con-
trol models such as Role-Based Access Control, achieving
this type of restrictions is very hard, if not impossible.
At this point, we discuss some motivational examples from
a commercial environment to motivate our argument regard-
ing fundamental gaps in access control even further. In-
creased infringement of copyright is a serious concern for
right holders, including businesses and individuals. For text
files, there are a number of tools that can detect copyrighted
material. As an example, software such as TurnitIn (Tur-
nitin.com) is now commonly used by universities to detect
plagiarism [10]. Similar tools exist for images and videos,
e.g. see Tineye.com. However, according to [11], copyright
infringement is still a growing problem and current mech-
anisms are not deemed to be effective in reducing it. It is
obvious that along with detection, prevention mechanisms
are also required. For example, whenever a researcher is
preparing a manuscript and quotes a part of the text, both
text and citation should be copied.
Due to the pervasive use of portable computers, includ-
ing laptops and smartphones, many organizations allow, and
even encourage, Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) for em-
ployees [12]. With this type of organizational policy, ensur-
ing confidentiality and integrity is challenging. According
to studies such as [13, 14], this has resulted in security im-
plications for data leakage, data theft and regulatory com-
pliance. We argue that the fact that existing access control
mechanisms are too primitive is one of the reasons for these
problems. Today, Apple’s App Store, is a bigger business
than Hollywood and the number of available applications
is increasing day per day [15]. To run an application, one
needs full execution right and once the application has read
and write access to a file, then the application can perform
any operation and execute any function on it. Hence, once
authorization is granted to a confidential document, there is
no control on how this access is used. For example, the user
can print, email or share it through other applications.
The root causes of many security problems due to out-
dated access control have probably been best described by
researchers such as Desmedt [16], Erlingsson [17] and Park
and Sandhu [18]. In brief, Access Control Matrix (ACM)
the core concept behind current implementable systems pre-
dates the Internet, computer viruses and massive hackings.
At that time of conception, computers had limited resources
and there were very limited number of applications. To-
day, however, there are huge number of applications on each
platform with a massive number of functionalities. More-
over, the Internet is only one of the means through which
information can leave the user’s device. This implies that
information flow control mechanisms that rely on entropy to
quantify information flow are not reliable by themselves as
entropy does not measure the value and the importance of
data. At the same time, leakage of a single bit of informa-
tion could result in loss, or a gain, of “millions of dollars”
— we refer the interested reader to the deception plan, Op-
eration Quicksilver, of World War II for understanding the
implications of the leakage of one single bit [19, 20].
Therefore, we believe it is time for revisiting the founda-
tions of access control, one of the oldest information control
mechanisms. It is important to design models that are com-
patible with existing access control models and at the same
time can ensure confidentiality and integrity of information
in a flexible manner. Inspired by Operator Oriented En-
cryption [9] and Functional Encryption [21], we introduce
Function-Based Access Control. From a foundation view-
point we replace the access control matrix with an Access
Control Tensor (ACT), which in effect is a generalization of
an access control matrix. In FBAC, objects are data blocks
and functions are the commands available in applications,
such as Copy/Paste and Search. In the policy specifica-
tions of FBAC, the commands may be defined as standard
— as we know them today, or restricted. For example, the
Copy/Paste commands could be custom defined such that
when a researcher quotes a part of the text that has cita-
tion, both the text and citation are copied together to the
destination. Or, email function could be customized such
that when a sensitive part of a document is emailed, the
supervisor is always copied. Moreover, in FBAC, protected
objects do not have to be predefined, and the function can
be customized to protect objects that are created on the fly.
In Section VI, a number of examples are shown to describe
what this means and why this is a major advantage com-
pared to existing solutions. In our proposed access control
model, applications do not have blind folded execution right
and can only invoke commands that have been authorized
for data segments in respect to subjects. To the best of our
knowledge, FBAC is the only access control model capable
of supporting this level of precision. FBAC provides a sys-
tematic solution to some of the known failures of access con-
trol and replaces adhoc solutions deployed by organizations.
The rest of this paper is structured as following. We start
with a Background section and then present Function-Based
Access Control in Section 3. Thereafter, we discuss Policy,
Enforcement and Implementation of FBAC, and in Section
5 we walk through our prototype implementation. The pa-
per concludes with a critical discussion, where we highlight
the advantages, challenges and a number of directions for
future work.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Traditional Access Control Models
Access control matrix, introduced in 1971 by Lampson
[22], remains the core concept for a large fraction of the
literature on access control [18]. The access control ma-
trix specifies individual relationships between entities wish-
ing access, Subject(S), and the system resources they wish
to access, Object(O). For each S and O pair an explicit au-
thorized access, (P ) appears in the corresponding entry in a
two-dimensional matrix. The authroization values may in-
clude reading, creating, editing, deleting, and executing and
the objects are files and other system resources. Harrison,
Ruzzo, and Ullman [23] identified six primitive operations
that transit a system state and established Turing complete-
ness of the access matrix, which shows the expressive power
of ACM. As discussed in [24], the direct implementation of
access control matrix is not efficient. However, most ac-
cess control mechanisms in use are based on models, such
as Access Control Lists (ACL) and Capabilities [3, 4], which
are derived from the ACM [25]. Interestingly, researchers
have even formally proved that access control models such
as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) are, in fact, built on
top of ACM [25].
2.2 Modern Access Control Models
There has been an increasing concern on the limitations
of RBAC in current dynamic and distributed computing en-
vironment. Mainly, role explosion - where each role requires
different sets of permissions and large number of roles have
to be defined - and delays caused due to the role engineering,
are limiting factors in the further practice of RBAC [26]. As
a result, a number of extensions have been proposed for this
model, e.g. [27, 28, 29]. On the other hand, to overcome lim-
itations of traditional access control, alternative application
specific models were also proposed such as relationship based
access control [30] and task based access control [31]. How-
ever, all of these extensions and models are purpose built
solutions and cannot be generalized into a single framework.
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) is a general model
that associates attributes to subjects and objects. In ABAC,
with proper usage of attributes it is possible to have ACL for
Discretionary Access Control (DAC), security classifications
for Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and roles for RBAC.
Moreover, it supports integrating a range of new attributes
for access control and having a uniform framework, solves
many of the shortcomings of core RBAC [32]. An important
advantage of ABAC is that access permissions do not have
to be pre-assigned to users and can be computed at the time
of request. UCONABC [18] is a conceptual model proposed
by Park and Sandhu for ABAC [32]. In this model, Au-
thorizations evaluate subject and object attributes for the
requested right, Obligations are mandatory requirements for
a subject and Conditions are system-oriented factors. For
instance, security clearance is an attribute for authorization,
agreement with the terms and conditions is an obligation and
the current location is a condition.
2.3 Access Control with Data-block Granular-
ity
As mentioned in Section 1, information access control may
require applying restrictions based on the content and con-
text related to access requests. Hence, there are an in-
creasing number of publications in the literature that aim
to apply access control at the level of document content
in different scenarios. A vast majority of these proposals
are based on the foundational papers published by Bertino
et al., which apply content level protection for XML doc-
uments [33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. Specifically, in [34], authors
proposed content level access control mechanism for XML
documents to enable selective access to data available over
the Web. The access control model is described using Doc-
ument Type Definition (DTD) and considers specific oper-
ations, mainly browsing and authoring. However, this work
does not provide a general methodology and lacks a role-
based model. Moreover, in [36], Bertino et al. proposed
a mechanism to define access policies for XML documents
based on user profile and structure and content of a docu-
ment. They also proposed a mechanism to encrypt different
portions of a document with different encryption keys and to
selectively distribute the keys among the users based on the
access policies. They proposed an architecture to distribute
the documents and proved that their scheme generates min-
imum number of keys.
Recently, Biswas et al. [38] proposed a content level access
control mechanism for Swift storage service for the Open-
Stack cloud computing platform. Swift stores outsourced
data in a container that is associated with an Access Con-
trol List (ACL). This ACL controls the access of the object
inside the container. The authors proposed a content level
access control on swift object that can be combined with the
ACL associated with the container to control the user that
can access different parts of an object based on the creden-
tial of data requester. The authors utilized JavaScript Ob-
ject Notation (JSON) to represent data stored in the swift
object. They proposed a label based access control to label
each JSON item and the data user and then define an access
policy to determine the user who can perform certain action
on a particular JSON item. In [38], the authors utilized
the concepts of XML data dissemination in handling JSON
data. Moreover, they do not discuss how the view of the
data is generated based on access control or whether data
encryption is used or not. Memory requirement is huge due
to the fact that a large number of JSON items are labeled.
2.4 Digital Right Management
Digital Right Management, DRM, is one way of protect-
ing content that is disseminated. It was recognized as one
of the top ten emerging technologies that will change the
world [39]. A fundamental advantage of DRM is separat-
ing content from the rights. This enables free distribution
of content and then enforcing license procurement for usage
[40]. A robust DRM system requires a trusted client side ref-
erence monitor and uses cryptographic schemes to enforce
and monitor access restrictions [41]. There was a surge in
the number of papers on DRM until early 2000, but mainly
due to usability problems, easy bypass methods [41], diffi-
culty in achieving mass scale persistent control, consumer
privacy issues, lack of standards, and interoperability of for-
mats, the trend reversed [42]. DRM is mainly regarded as
a collection of enabling technologies, such as watermarking,
and lacks proper models and security policies [41, 42, 18].
Due to this, access control and DRM rarely go under the
same umbrella. UCONABC is one of the few models that
has tried to integrate DRM into access control.
2.5 Functional Encryption
Operator Oriented Encryption [9] and Functional Encryp-
tion [21] argue that the traditional binary approach in de-
cryption needs to change. In such systems, decryption keys
may reveal only partial information about the plaintext. For
example, when decrypting an image with a cropping key, a
cropped version of image is revealed and nothing more [43].
Boneh defines functional encryption as “where a decryption
key enables a user to learn a specific function of the en-
crypted data and nothing else. In a functional-encryption
system, a trusted authority holds a master secret key known
only to the authority. When the authority is given the de-
scription of some function f as input, it uses its master secret
key to generate a derived secret key sk[f ] associated with f .
Now anyone holding sk[f ] can compute f(x) from an en-
cryption of any x” [21]. The main challenge for functional
encryption is to “construct a system that supports creation
of keys for any function in both public and non-public in-
dex settings” [43]. Also, efficiency of functional encryption
is dependent on specific cryptographic constructions. Over-
all, although promising, functional encryption is still in its
infancy and much further practical and theoretical advance-
ment is required to solve associated open problems.
3. FUNCTION-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
We start by contrasting how data is considered by the
cryptographic community versus how it is considered by
these working on access control. We will then use this to
explain the lessons we want to learn and how we can apply
these to access control.
We first explain the cryptographic idea of secure multi-
party computation (see e.g. [44, 45, 46]). In this concept, a
function is computed by different parties. Only the output of
this function is leaked and nothing more. We illustrate this
concept with the following example. Alice, an authorized
third party, searches for a string of data in files stored in-
side the Department of Defense or inside the Department of
State. Suppose there is such a file that contains this string.
Then secure multiparty computation will only reveal its ex-
istence without leaking whether this string is on the comput-
ers of the Department of Defense, or on the Department of
State, or on both.
The second concept we survey is the one of “operator ori-
ented encryption” [47, p. 164], now more known as “func-
tional encryption” [21]. In functional encryption, given an
encrypted text of a certain plaintext, one can compute from
the ciphertext f(Plaintext), where f is an authorized func-
tion, without revealing anything additionally about the rest
of the plaintext. As an example, using this tool one could
“search” whether a certain string is (or not) in encrypted
data without decrypting it. Please refer to Section 2.5 for a
more detailed definition.
This last example is in sharp contrast with how access to
data is being controlled today. Indeed, a person searching
for the word “terrorist” in a file, must have received read
permission for the file and execute permission for the pro-
gram that does the search. Having the read permission to
the file is an “Open Sesame” approach, giving the person
unlimited read access to the whole file! In our approach the
only thing the user will learn is whether the file contains
the word “terrorist” or not. We note that a Unix command
as grep (which perform a search in files) facilitates output
control, a topic which we will include in our model.
3.1 A First Definition
As also mentioned in Section 2.1, the current approach
finds its foundations in the 1974 paper by Lampson [22]
and formalized in 1976 by Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman [23]. Its
main limitation, from our perspective, is that it has only
two dimensions, being, one dimension corresponding with
objects and one with subjects. In our definition we will use
a three dimensional approach and use“function”as the third
dimension. Note that we regard “function” as a synonym for
“operation”.
In our definition, an object could correspond, with a file,
an XML record, as data in a register, etc. Moreover, func-
tions could be at the level of the operating system (such as
grep), but also an operation inside an application (such as
search used inside a browser, an editor, an e-mail reader (or
Mail User Agents), a global position applications).
Before giving our actual definition we note that the num-
ber of inputs to a function depends on the function. Our
definition has to take this into account. Moreover, not all
inputs to a function are “predefined,” as we now explain.
Consider grep. Usually grep operates on a file and a pat-
tern is given, e.g., from the terminal. Moreover, grep has
several options, such as “quiet,” which makes grep output a
Boolean. We do not regard the “pattern” and the options
as objects. We will explain later how to deal with these
non-object inputs.
To deal with the fact that a function can have more than
one object as input (such as copy/paste) we introduce the
following definition.
Definition 1. When O denotes the set of object, we let
O1 = O and recursively we define Oj = Oj−1 × O (j ≥ 2).
Moreover, we let O0 = ∅. We also define
O∗ =
⋃
j≥0
Oj .
We now define a first version of Access Control Tensor
(ACT).
Definition 2. Let S be the set of subjects, F a set of
functions, O∗ as defined earlier. The three-dimensional ta-
ble A is a mapping from S×F ×O∗ → {False, True, N/A}.
When f ∈ F has n objects as input, o ∈ O∗ is an m-tuple, s
is a subject, then A(s, f, o) = N/A when m 6= n. If m = n,
and A(s, f, o) = True then subject s can execute the func-
tion (command) f on object o, else the subject can not. We
call A the access tensor. We call (S, F,O,A) an elementary
function-based access control, or E-FBAC.
Evidently, the set {N/A, False, True} could be replaced by
{N/A, Forbidden, Authorized}.
One could observe that the typical entries to the Access
Control Matrix (ACM), such as read and write, do not ap-
pear in our ACT. The reason for this is that our functions
that can read cannot write. Moreover, every read only func-
tion can be regarded as writing to standard output. So, the
function, or the input parameters of the function, will define
that aspect. Note that each command inside an app, such
as an editor, is regarded as a function and falls under above
access control.
3.2 The Main Definition
The elementary function-based access control is too prim-
itive for many different reasons. Let us reconsider grep and
assume we allow a user in Homeland Security to search files
in the CIA for the word terrorist. Using the grep option
“context=NUM” and using a very large value for NUM, the
user will be able to access the complete file, which might not
be the purpose. Moreover, the user could use grep to search
for other keywords (or in general patterns) than the word
terrorist. We first discuss how we could fit such restrictions
in E-FBAC.
Consider we define a new command grep terrorist count=5,
which only allows the aforementioned user to search in files
for the word terrorist and which prints 5 lines of context.
In other words this command has no other options. Then
controlling access when using grep terrorist count=5 can be
described using the E-FBAC approach. Obviously, in prac-
tice we want the user to have the flexibility to use options,
which we now address.
Definition 3. Let S be the set of subjects, F a set of
functions, O∗ as defined in Definition 1. The entries to the
three-dimensional table A with dimensions identified by S,
F , and O∗ are of the type “False”, “True[P(s,f,o)],” and N/A.
When f ∈ F has n objects as input, o ∈ O∗ an m-tuple, s a
subject, then A(s, f, o) = N/A when m 6= n. When m = n,
and A(s, f, o) = False, the subject can not execute the func-
tion (command) f on object o. In the other case [P(s,f,o)] is
an option. If the option is specified, then the predefined pro-
gram P(s,f,o) comprises the joint list of options (with their
parameter) together with the standard input. If P returns
True, then the function f with the aforementioned list of
options and standard input can be executed by s on o. We
call A the access tensor. We call (S, F,O,A) a generalized
function-based access control, or G-FBAC.
Obviously, using G-FBAC in practice might make access
control very slow. We suggest instead to replace P(s,f,o) by
a regular expression. If the list of options and the standard
input satisfies the regular expression, f with the restrictions
indicated in Definition 3, can be executed. We call this
approach a regular-expression function-based access control,
or in short RE-FBAC.
Obviously our approach is very different from the one giv-
ing subject execution right to functions (or operations) and
read/write to objects. Indeed, whether an operation can be
executed or not should be object dependent. To emphasize
this aspect of our approach, we call this the Function-Data
Granularity, or the F-D granularity. It allows to specify
that a user can only use “grep” with very restricted options
and patterns on outside data, but allowing grep in an unre-
stricted way on his/her own data.
Before we proceed further in this section, let us make some
preliminary observations. As is well known, any three di-
mensional table can be mapped into several two dimensional
tables. Indeed, for each (subject,object) we could specify
which functions could be executed, and provide above re-
strictions specified by P(s,f,o). However, anyone familiar
with Lampson’s approach immediately observes that this
does not match the Lampson’s description and one also
looses the deeper insight the third dimension brings.
It is obvious that our discussion on “grep” is just an ex-
ample and that similar OS commands or app commands
can be restricted using FBAC. We note that the classical
Attribute-Based Access Control for XML does not allow us
to achieve our goal. Indeed, XML organizes the document
into“records.” When granting read access to this record, the
maximal output a user can see is the whole record. When
applying FBAC to an XML document or any other type of
file, the maximal output a user can see, can contain signif-
icantly less data than the full record. Finally, the power
of FBAC in non-textual contexts will be illustrated in the
proof of implementation (See Section 5).
3.2.1 Further Output Controls
We first note that in certain contexts it still makes sense
to define customized versions of classical commands, such as
grep. Indeed, a customized command could further restrict
the output by blanking out words or sentences containing
predefined words such as “submarine.” Unix allows the use
of “pipe” (i.e., |), which from a mathematical viewpoint cor-
respond to a composition of functions, e.g., f after g. To
regulate access to the use of pipe, we could regard f ◦ g as a
new function and then control this as above. We now discuss
an alternative approach.
If we want to allow the use of pipe and want to avoid
having to deal with specifying all possible combinations of
compositions1, the following approach, which we illustrate
with grep, could be used. Grep can be executed on files,
but also on standard input, the latter enabling to use grep
on an output of a prior command when using pipe. In our
approach the latter use of grep corresponds with a case in
which grep has no predefined object as input. That implies
that we can regard grep as being two commands, one being
grep in file and grep in standard. The first has one prede-
fined object as input, the second has zero. In the latter, the
restriction on the standard input will then be specified by
the option P , as defined in Definition 3.
3.3 Access Control Tensor (ACT) in Practice
Storing rights in an access control matrix is often too
impractical or would slow down enforcement. Several ap-
proaches have been used. Some of these are policy depen-
dent, such as the Unix concept of having the user (owner),
group(s), and world , when dealing with access control to
files. From a conceptional viewpoint, this policy corresponds
with a compressed authorization list per object. We now
wonder what the equivalent ones are when using an access
control tensor.
In the classical approach, an authorization list corresponds
to a column in the access control matrix. In other words,
given an object, we obtain this list. Since our approach is
3-dimensional, given solely an object, the rights described
related to that object are 2-dimensional, and so it can no
longer be called a list. We therefore call this an authoriza-
tion matrix, i.e., for a given object(s) o the authorization
matrix gives A(si, fj , o), i.e., all values A(si, fj , o) for all i
and all j. Obviously, we can compress this matrix by only
considering functions for which A(si, fj , o) will be different
from N/A.
In operating systems, capabilities play an important role.
In our setting this will be 2-dimensional and we talk about
capability matrix, or just capability. For each fixed sub-
ject s we can have a capability corresponding to the matrix
A(s, fi, oj), which contains these values for all i and all j.
Obviously, we can compress this matrix by only consider-
ing pairs of (functions,objects) for which A(s, fi, oj) will be
different from N/A.
Obviously, we will have a new 2-dimensional control mech-
anism, which when given a particular function will reveal
which subject have rights to which objects. Since this ma-
trix has the same dimensions than in the classical case, we
call this matrix an access control matrix. In other words,
for each fixed function f we can have an access control ma-
trix corresponding to the matrix A(si, f, oj), which contains
these values for all i and all j. Obviously, we can com-
press this matrix by only considering object(s) for which
A(si, f, oj) will be different from N/A.
When systems are large, storing above matrices may be
91Note that the number of different functions one can define with
a given finite domain is finite, but too large to have practical value.
impractical. Moreover, when we are using a particular ap-
plication, only the commands (functions) that are available
for this application are relevant. In such circumstances, we
will have two inputs, such as (subject, object) = (s, 0), and
want to know the rights to all (or a subset) of functions. We
call A(s, fi, o) given the values for all i, a function list. Obvi-
ously, we can perform the aforementioned N/A compression.
If we have an application P and we want to restrict the func-
tion list to the application, we write A|P (s, fi, o) to indicate
that fi is a function available in the application P and speak
of application restricted function list. Note that we can re-
gard the commands available in a terminal application, as
P = OS or P = terminal.
For security audits it might be useful to find to know who
has access to a certain object o when using a function or
command f . We call such a list a subject list and when given
(f, o) it gives A(si, f, o) for all i. When we have a distributed
system, we could restrict the subjects to T ⊆ S. We denote
this restriction as A|T (si, f, o). (We silently assume that
(f, o) is a meaningful pair.)
Finally, when given (s, f) we want to know on what ob-
jects the subject s can execute f and with what restrictions.
We call the corresponding list an object list it gives A(s, f, oi)
for all i. When we want to restrict the list of objects to
B∗ ⊆ O∗, we have A|B∗ (s, f, oi). B∗ may correspond to
object(s) inside a certain directory, or objects owned by a
certain organization, etc.
The above concepts can be used for all our variants of
FBAC, i.e., E-FBAC, G-FBAC, RE-FBAC.
Extensions: Our definitions trivially allow to extend the
Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman [23] approach, see e.g., [48, pp. 194-
199]. Since this is rather straightforward, we leave the de-
tails as an exercise. Note that the primitive operations have
to take into account that we are dealing with a tensor instead
of a matrix.
Moreover,in our definition we used S for subject instead
of S∗. Indeed, cryptographers use the concept of Access
Structure, in which trust is put in sets of parties. Replacing
S by S∗ and using Access Structures is beyond the scope
of this paper, but deserves a proper study when extending
FBAC (see Section 7).
4. POLICY, ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLE-
MENTATION
Up until now, we have formally and theoretically pre-
sented FBAC. At this point, we have a discussion on Pol-
icy, Enforcement and Implementation of FBAC. Sandhu et
al. [49] have proposed the notion of PEI in an attempt to
bridge the gap between abstract policies and real implemen-
tations. It should be noted that our discussion in this sec-
tion, and the next, is one way of implementing FBAC and
uses Authorization Matrix to implement the ACT. There
are alternative ways of implementing FBAC, which may be
more efficient and/or secure and/or suitable. We leave this
as future work and present some suggestion in the Future
Work section.
4.1 Policy
Bell-LaPadula [50] is a famous approach to model a con-
fidentiality policy. Using lattices, its limitations are well
known (see e.g. [51] for a survey on the topic). Similarly,
the Biba [52] model is considered the dual for integrity. We
now explain how, for example, lattice based models, such as
Bell-LaPadula and Biba can be generalized to FBAC. Note
that we do not advocate the use of these lattice based mod-
els, but that we only show how they could be used.
In a lattice based information flow policy we have a set SC
of security classes and a relation  on SC such that (SC,
) is a lattice. In the case of confidentiality, given objects
x and y and their corresponding security classes x and y,
information can flow from x to y if x  y. In Biba’s model,
when s is a subject and o is an object, s can write when
o  s, where the s is the integrity level of s and similarly for
o.
We describe our generalization of the above approaches.
We have function dependent security classes. In practice we
will specify these for subsets of functions. We now explain
the advantages of our function dependent policy focusing on
confidentiality.
In a military environment we could use strict Bell-LaPadula,
but now introduce new classes for very special customized
functions such as grep terrorist count=5 (or variants further
restricting the output) and make certain that the appropri-
ate employees at homeland security are in a high enough
security class for the function grep terrorist count=5. Note
that by having these security classes function dependent, we
are able to give grep terrorist (without count restriction) ac-
cess to files at the CIA to a restricted number of employees
at Homeland Security. So, we can regard that to the pair
(f, o), where f is a function and o is an object, corresponds
a security class (f, o). Information can only flow to subject
s if (f, o)  s.
Obviously, we can adapt in a similar manner non-lattice
based access control policies. We note that we do not see
a reason to change the Chinese Wall policy. It seems to us
that complete separation needs to be maintained in circum-
stances where the Chinese Wall policy is used.
4.2 Enforcement and Implementation
4.2.1 Atoms and Atomic Documents
One of the main requirements of implementing FBAC is
proper storage of data and authorizations. It is possible to
enforce FBAC on any file type as long as the content sections
(text and media) are uniquely identifiable. For example, we
have used XML in our proof of concept implementation (see
Section 5).
Once the aforementioned requirement is satisfied, it is
possible to have, what we call, an Atomic-Document. An
Atomic Document, represented with .ADoc extension, is
composed of one or more Atoms. Atoms are are the smallest
segments of a document and are undividable. These could
be paragraphs in an unstructured document, a sub-tree in
a tree structured data, etc. Atoms have an accompanying
policy, which once executed for a subject returns a Function
List (F ) — the policy is an Authorization Matrix but when
we regard the matrix for one specific subject then it becomes
a Function List.
In an Atomic-Document, an Atom can be categorized as
being:
Single or Linked: An atom is Linked if a function exe-
cuted on it affects one or more other atoms. In other words,
having f(i) and f(j) as a function for Atom(i) and Atom(j)
respectively, where i 6= j, E(f(x)) defined as the execu-
tion/invocation of f(x) on Atom(x), and “→” means results
in, a Linked atom can be defined as when:
E(f(i))→ E(f(j)).
An example of Linked Atom and how it could be used is
explained in Section 5.
We define F (i) as the set of allowed functions for Atom(i)
and F (D) as the set of not allowed functions for a document
D. An Atom(i) is an Atom for document D if and only if
the following consistency boolean condition holds:
F (i) ∩ F (D) = {}. (1)
Document D is .ADoc when the above condition holds for all
Atom(i) in document D. This condition serves to prevent
contradictions.
Atomic Document with Classification Level: To im-
plement access control models such as MAC and security
models such as Bell-Lapadula, we require assigning a clas-
sification level to each object. Atomic documents supports
defining classification labels for Atoms and .ADoc files. In
this case, having C(i) as classification level of Atom(i) and
C(D) as classification level of document D, we update the
consistency boolean Condition 1 as:
F (i) ∩ F (D) = {} ∧ C(i) ⊂ C(D). (2)
5. PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTA-
TION: THE SMACS EDITOR
As discussed earlier, copyright is a serious concern for
right holders. Plagiarism is one of the trending cases re-
lated to copyright [53, 54], which is considered a case of
misconduct in academia and the publishing industry. As
suggested by the relevant investigations [55, 56], limitations
of methods for detection calls for innovative preventative
mechanisms. We have therefore developed an editor that en-
forces Function-Based Access Control, Smacs, which if used
properly could be an effective prevention mechanism against
plagiarism. Note that we assume ALL documents are stored
in the required format by the editor, see Atomic-Document
defined in Section 4.2. We also presume that authors ONLY
use the developed editor for creating documents — an issue
we further discuss in Section 7.
Smacs, or Secure Emacs, is built on top of the GNU Emacs
editor. We have created a major mode for Emacs. This
mode applies FBAC to both text and images. In Smacs, the
access control tensor is implemented as an Authorization
Matrix. Once the Atoms, i.e. objects, are defined then
the authorization policy is stored as an array in a separate
file. Whenever an access request is sent to the reference
monitor, in this case Smacs, then the array is processed and
retrieves a value, which is a regular expression characterizing
the function, as defined in Section 3.2.
All of the typical commands of Word processing software
are available in Smacs. In order to facilitate the user expe-
rience when preparing documents, the documents are pre-
pared in LATEXformat with a custom defined “\smacs” com-
mand. In Smacs, the representation is different from how
data is stored and files are saved with .ADoc format. The
relevant conversion is triggered when accessing and closing
the files using an integrated conversion tool. To ensure that
only supported functions and commands can be triggered,
we had to change the source code of Emacs and recompile it.
In this way, we could ensure that no other Emacs mode or
commands that could have violated our enforcement mech-
anism can be executed. In the following, will briefly review
sample workflows for three types of users of Smacs, namely
the Author, a Co-Author and a Viewer. While doing so, we
assume Smacs is deployed in a scenario as depicted in Figure
1.
Workflow for an Author: An Author generates a new
Atomic-Document, or ADocx file, from scratch using Smacs
Application. This is then stored at Data Provider servers
(see Figure 1).
Currently, for simplicity, the default is set such that each
paragraph is regarded as an Atom. However, the author
can amend this for any part of the text according to his/her
own requirement. An Author is asked a set of questions by
Smacs so the default Function List for Atoms of the Atomic-
Document are created. For example, the author is asked
whether this document is printable or not. Thereafter, the
default Function List is assigned a list of \Smacs commands
throughout the document. The original set of functions that
an author can define for atoms may also be specified by an
administrator using access control models such as RBAC
– i.e. for each role a set of allowed functions are defined.
Indeed, the author at his own discretion, or according to the
authority granted by an administrator, may change these.
For example, an author may wish to prevent copy on part of
the text or require that if this part is printed then his/her
name is placed in bold format on top of the page.
To showcase how Smacs works, a number of custom de-
fined functions such as Watermark-Enforced Print(), Byte-
Restricted Copy(), Character-Limited Copy(), Sensitive-Word-
Exclusion Copy(), Force-Carbon-Copy Email() are currently
available to an author using Smacs. The author can also
specify custom Search functions for a document using regu-
lar expressions, e.g. Hide-Sensitive-Word Search() takes as
input a set of words, or Atom unique ID, and hides them
from a set of subjects. Or, Line-Restricted Search() retrieves
a specific number above and below for a query. For a moti-
vational example on the usage of this type of function, see
Section 3.2. Evidently, not all of these functions may be
required for the plagiarism usecase.
Workflow for a Co-Author: A Co-Author is any other
user allowed to make changes to the Atomic-Document cre-
ated by an Author. By default, the set of functions and ca-
pabilities available to this user is a subset of those available
to the original author. The author, or an administrator, can
restrict changing certain parts of the document and could
restrict a Co-Author’s ability on amending authorized func-
tions. Currently, Smacs supports defining authorization for
a global Co-Author and specific policy for each of the pos-
sible Co-Authors.
Workflow for a Viewer: A Viewer uses Smacs to browse
the Atomic-document and retrieves an ADoc file stored at
Data Provider – i.e. s/he cannot edit the document. A
trusted client-side reference monitor, in this case Smacs,
enforces access restrictions for the Viewer as per the poli-
cies defined by an administrator. Smacs takes as input an
ADoc file, which contains both the policy and anADocX.
First, it computes requirements for the Read function for all
Atoms. Thereafter, whenever another command available
to a viewer such as Print is invoked it refers to the policy
Figure 1: One possible Smacs deployment scenario. Figure 2: Image blurred when relevant atom is not
included or the user does not have the right to view
it.
file for deciding about authorization. Therefore, if, for ex-
ample, the Viewer is not authorized to view an image, the
image can be hidden, blurred or shown with a watermark –
such features may be useful to prevent unauthorized use of
copyrighted images. Figure 2, is an example for this case.
Supporting authorization of customized functions and us-
ing the Atomic data structure as described earlier, which
supports having Linked Atoms (see Section 4.2.1) in a doc-
ument, it is possible to have plagiarism preventive mecha-
nisms. For example, while a Viewer is not allowed to read
the document itself, s/he may be allowed to Copy part of the
text into another a document that she/he is authoring. With
a customized Copy/Paste function, it is possible to enforce
that whenever a text is copied from the document then infor-
mation is automatically imported as a quote and the source
becomes a citation in the destination Atomic document and
if the citation is ever removed the quote becomes unavailable.
5.1 Usability and Performance Analysis of Smacs
The number of features available to each category of users
in Smacs, requires careful consideration about the usability
aspect. We have customized a number of graphical packages
available in Emacs to improve the user experience. When
defining authorizations defaults play a major role and, in
Smacs, authors can define these by answering a set of ques-
tions. When customizing each part of the document a tab
is available on the editor window that makes it convenient
to change the attributes. Moreover, for any parts that the
Viewer is not authorized to read the document information
is blacked out and custom error messages are shown when
invoking any non-permitted command – custom messages
provide meaningful information and instructions about the
error message and minimize disruption of the user experi-
ence when using the editor.
In general, the granularity of control provided by FBAC
should not be a factor against usability and it should be
handled with taste by software developers. Publishing a
set of recommendations for applications developed based on
FBAC will be done in our following future work. It is also
important to note that our performance analysis of current
implementation of Smacs compared to the standard Emacs
editor, in terms of memory, CPU and responsiveness indicate
a negligible performance impact.
6. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
There is a growing body of literature that takes an in-
cremental approach in detection and prevention of insider
threats. These include using monitoring techniques [57],
combining structural anomaly detection with modelling of
psychological factors to identify potential insiders [58], ex-
amining behavioural characteristics of potential insiders to
distinguish between malicious and benign behaviours [59]
and multi-disciplinary approaches to assist an organisation’s
analyst in understanding attacks [60, 61]. Other approaches
include using Honeypots to uncover insiders [62], distributed
analysis of data sources, both computer and human factor
based [63], and using using Hidden Markov Models to iden-
tify divergence between normal and insider threat patterns
[64]. A common argument in this literature is that detection
of insider threats is “not an exact science”. Therefore, we be-
lieve these approaches could be regarded as complimentary
to our work and that access control is the most critical se-
curity mechanism to prevent insider threats [8]. Moreover,
with FBAC, due to the level of granularity and practical fea-
tures of ACT such as Subject List, it is possible to narrow
down the number of suspects who could have had access to
a leaked information much more efficiently.
On the other hand and as mentioned in Section 2.2, a num-
ber of relevant papers exists in the field of access control. In-
deed, models such as UCONABC have the potential of solv-
ing some of the limitations in existing access control. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, there exist no work until
this date that has provided a coherent model for authorizing
function executions at the level of data blocks. Leave alone,
granting custom defined and restricted functions. Crypto-
graphic solutions such as Digital Right Management (DRM)
and Functional Encryption that aim to protect content lack
proper policy specifications models and standards or are too
slow. In addition, we regard DRM and similar software-
engineering solutions deployed at organizations to be of an
ad-hoc approach towards addressing data protection require-
ments. [41] includes some of the main challenges limiting the
wider adoption of DRMs.
As mentioned in Section 1, entropy does not measure the
value of information and we find this literature different in
scope with our work. There is also a body of computer secu-
rity literature such as [65, 66, 67] that provide information
flow control solutions at the level of the operating system.
This type of work mainly relies on labelling operating sys-
tem objects and controlling the operating system processes
when accessing these objects. These do not consider objects
at the level of data blocks and do not target monitoring ex-
ecution of commands inside applications. Simply put, both
the granularity and scope of research is different. However,
as we will discuss in the next section when one wants to
enforce FBAC at the operating system level, then this liter-
ature may become relevant.
7. FUTURE WORK
Our prototype implementation was focused on operations
inside one application, being an editor. Emacs was chosen
to demonstrate, for example, how the Copy/Paste command
could dramatically be changed, in particular when writing
LATEX documents. Several other functions/commands, such
as Search, send E-mail, Print, etc., can be used at an OS
level, or inside different applications. Hence, if we wish to
enforce FBAC properly, there should be no method available
on a computer to bypass this. One way to achieve this is to
develop an OS where file access controlled by classical access
control matrix, is replaced by FBAC. A question worth ad-
dressing is to wonder how FBAC can help in practice with
controlling information flow inside an OS, i.e., when consid-
ering the registers and memory as objects. Having a proper
security kernel that facilitates such OS would have several
advantages. Given such a security kernel, applications can
use the security kernel as a reference monitor to enforce the
policy.
Investigating the capabilities of FBAC in addressing selec-
tive information sharing requirements in cloud computing
and mobile platforms are further directions worth investi-
gating [68]. As a matter of fact, we are currently developing
a set of libraries that will allow applications running on An-
droid smartphones to use FBAC and will release this in our
future work.
We now discuss what impact our paper may have on the
development of new policies. Different policies fit different
organizations. However, all current policies are in fact based
on a classical access control matrix approach. We have ex-
tended some well know policies to adapt them to an FBAC
setting. These extensions are rather trivial. Further research
may lead to a better understanding how the 3-rd new dimen-
sion, i.e., the function, could be exploited to come up with
policies to fight insider threats much better, while at the
same time allowing flexibility that are currently impossible.
Moreover, developing policy specification languages — such
as XACML [69] for attribute-based access models — prop-
erly suited to the requirements of FBAC is an important
requirement that has to be addressed in future work.
As stated in Section 3.3, cryptographers interested in se-
cret sharing [70, 71, 72] often regard individuals as untrust-
worthy, but trust is associated to appropriate subsets of
“parties.” Due to the Snowden leak, secret sharing is being
used for backup purposes. This is a rather limited appli-
cation. If one wants to work out this type of approach, a
typical subject needs to be replaced by an access structure
[72], which is a list of subsets. Each subset in this list is
trusted. One of the challenges is on how to implement this.
Indeed, let say {Alice,Bob} are in the access structure. Does
it mean that Alice can only open a file if at exactly the same
time Bob tries to do the same. Or should, at the moment,
Alice tries to open a file, Bob be notified, and then approve.
Such systems have been implemented to enforce very strong
audit. However, they have never been formally studied by
regarding this as an acces controlled by two parties. More
questions arise, such as the fact that access structures con-
tain subsets of parties, and not ordered tuples. If we were
to use ordered pairs as (Alice,Bob) could indicate that Al-
ice is allowed to open a file, provide Bob agree. However, if
(Bob,Alice) is not in the ordered access structure, then Bob
might not be able to open the file (i.e., when {Bob} is not
in the access structure).
Although there has been a lot of progress on functional en-
cryption, that does not mean that there is a cryptographic
mechanism to enforce an FBAC policy cryptographically.
Such a cryptographic enforcement would correspond with
(at least) the use of digital signatures to guarantee that the
person granting the rights is authorized. One of the chal-
lenges is to guarantee that when new objects are created
from old ones, i.e., combining plaintexts decrypted using
functional encryption, access to the new objects will have
the correct functional encryption to guarantee the enforce-
ment of the information flow policy, i.e., a re-encryption can
not bypass the policy.
8. CONCLUSION
Mainly motivated by the ongoing insider threats, we changed
Access Control Matrix, the core concept behind current im-
plementations of access control, to Access Control Tensor
(ACT). We discussed why a 2-Dimensional representation of
authorizations is a limitation and argued how our proposed
ACT enables achieving a breakthrough level of granularity
in access control. We proposed Function-Based Access Con-
trol, a new access control model built on top of ACT, which
enables designing solutions that could potentially minimize
security threats relevant to modern access control failures.
In FBAC applications no-longer give blind folded execution
rights and access is defined at the level of available com-
mands, such as Copy/Paste, Search, and Email. Commands
can be custom defined in FBAC and are applied at the gran-
ularity of data segments rather than files. Finally, we dis-
cussed the Policy, Enforcement and Implementation (PEI)
aspects of FBAC, provided directions on how to implement,
adopt and extend it.
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